The recent exposé by The Indian Express about the Election Commission (EC) of India drew our attention to the workings of one of the most important institutions enabling Indian democracy. It's important to take note, because the responsibilities bestowed upon the EC by the constitution are humungous, and are defining in how the Indian democracy is constructed and how it operates.
Two key attributes about the EC caught my attention:
- The first was its size - Three election commissioners
- The second was its independence - or the lack there of.
- The first was its size - Three election commissioners
- The second was its independence - or the lack there of.
Given my ongoing research on board compositions, I started seeing parallels, and I think some of them are relevant. It is believed that very small boards tend to lack the depth and diversity of skillset to be able to process all kinds of information that is available to them. While very large boards tend to be less efficient because it becomes difficult for so many directors to come together and act as a cohesive body. There exists an optimum - say between 5 and 10 - which depends on the context, where information processing capacity and coordination efficiency can be reasonably maximized.
A glance through the EC Wikipedia page would tell you that size has been toyed with several times, but it's always been either 1 or 3. Now, even a cursory understanding suggests that the role of EC is much more vast and complex than the role of any board of any company. Do 3 people have sufficient capacity - both in terms of skillset and bandwidth - to process the kind of information that running the electoral machinery of India demands?
Independence has close links to the appointment processes. The true nature of independence in boards is often a matter of debate. Appointment processes have often come under scrutiny, given firms appoint independent directors to oversee the firm itself, and it's in the firm's interest to nominate directors who would be more aligned, scrutinize less or just cause less friction. Promoters often tap into their networks to find candidates while satisfying the regulatory mandate. SEBI has often made observations on the nature of independence and has also tightened the rules of late.
In the case of EC, the appointment process has also undergone revisions. The last revision in 2023 gives the incumbent government the dominant say on who constitutes the EC, directly contradicting the spirit of independence, and clearly creating a channel for capture of the institution. Unlike a board, regulator in this case is the democratic process itself, which involves all parties, and a push toward a 'fairer' model. But the problem is 3-fold - (i) the process is slow and chaotic, (ii) the parties don't really want 'fair', they want what would benefit them; and the incumbent has more power here. (iii) the parties are stakeholders in the process, and are often in competition with each other - so can't be trusted to act together and regulate it fairly.
